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A Binding and Perpetual Obligation: Protecting
Louisiana’s Sixteenth Section Land as a Natural
Resource
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson believed that if the United States was to
remain a free nation, it needed to become an educated nation.1 In a
1787 letter to James Madison, Jefferson remarked, “Above all things
I hope the education of the common people will be attended to;
convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most
security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.”2 Jefferson
also believed that government could help promote education in the
general populace by reserving land in newly formed towns for the
building of local schools.3
As the young United States gained more territory, and new states
entered the Union, Congress put Jefferson’s ideas into practice. In
exchange for statehood, Congress formed agreements4 with new
state governments in which discrete portions of land, “Sixteenth
Section”5 land, were permanently set aside for public schools.6
These compacts imposed a “binding and perpetual obligation” on
the states to use that land for the benefit of public education.7
Thomas Jefferson’s musings became the United States’ first national
education policy.
Sixteenth Section lands have recently been the source of legal
controversy between Louisiana school boards and the Louisiana oil
and gas industry.8 This conflict is aggravated by the lack of clarity in
both the statutory scheme and jurisprudence governing Sixteenth
Section land. Article XII, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution
grants the state immunity from prescription in all civil matters
unless dictated otherwise by statute.9 Decisions by Louisiana Courts
of Appeal have split over whether the state’s constitutional
Copyright 2014, by ZACHARY D. HOWSER.
1. See ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
179 (1970).
2. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Dec. 20, 1787), in WRITINGS 918 (1984).
3. See HEALEY, supra note 1, at 179.
4. See Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 523 (1980).
5. See Part II.A. (defining Sixteenth Section land). See generally C. Maison
Heidelberg, Note, Closing the Book on the School Trust Lands, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1581, 1584–91 (1992).
6. See infra Part II and note 19.
7. Andrus, 446 U.S. at 523.
8. See infra Part III.D.
9. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13.
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immunity from prescription should apply to actions involving
Sixteenth Section lands when that land is engaged in commerce with
the oil industry.10
If Sixteenth Section lands benefit from the state’s prescription
immunity, those companies that contract with school boards for
mineral exploration on Sixteenth Section land could potentially face
permanent exposure to imprescriptible causes of action. On the other
hand, if prescription is allowed to run, elected school board officials
must provide legal protection for Sixteenth Section lands, a task for
which the state is far better suited. Ultimately, Congress intended
that Sixteenth Sections should be held by the state solely for the
purpose of furthering public education. Elected school boards
should not be burdened with the legal responsibility of managing
legal claims involving Sixteenth Sections within standard
prescriptive time periods. Therefore, the state’s immunity from
prescription should be extended to actions involving Sixteenth
Section land.
The jurisprudential split on this issue does not stem from a value
judgment about these lands, but from a failure to properly categorize
Sixteenth Section land within Louisiana law. This Comment
attempts to provide the appropriate categorization for Sixteenth
Section land by examining the governing statutes and relevant
jurisprudence while focusing on policy considerations and civil law
concepts. This Comment then provides two judicial solutions to the
issue that the Louisiana Supreme Court may implement in lieu of
sweeping revision to the statutes governing Sixteenth Section land.
Part II examines the history of Sixteenth Section lands and how they
evolved into their present state. Part II also discusses the split among
the circuits over prescription on actions involving Sixteenth Section
land. Part III attempts to properly classify Sixteenth Section land in
civil law terms and suggests two legal solutions provided in the
existing framework of trust law and the public trust doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Sixteenth Section Lands
At the conclusion of the American Revolution, Great Britain
ceded the vast Northwest Territory to the United States, leaving the
new federal government in control of over 200,000 square miles of
land.11 In order to efficiently transfer this land to private ownership
and better prepare it for statehood, the Continental Congress
10. See infra Part III.D.
11. Heidelberg, supra note 5, at 1585.
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passed the Land Ordinance of 1785, which, among other things,
created the rectangular survey system for public land.12 Under this
system, all federal land was divided into six-mile square
townships.13 These townships were further subdivided into thirtysix, one-mile square Sections.14 The Sixteenth Section of each
township was deemed to be reserved “for the maintenance of
public schools.”15 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which
provided for the governance of the Northwest Territory, expressly
stated the underlying policy of the reservation by declaring that
“religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged.”16
These ordinances established a series of “honorary,” if not
legal, trust relationships between the federal government and the
states.17 Upon completion of the surveys, ownership of each
township and section was taken out of the federal government’s
control and vested in the new states.18 Congress subsequently
extended this reservation to all land acquired through the Louisiana
Purchase.19 As a result, when Louisiana was admitted into the
Union as a separate state in 1812, ownership of the reserved
Sixteenth Section land in each township passed to Louisiana’s state
government. In 1843, an Act of Congress granted states the right to
sell any land reserved for school use, so long as the proceeds from
any such sales were placed in “some productive fund” directed by
the state legislatures for the use and support of public schools.20
12. See Papasan v. United States, 756 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing
public land survey practices in Mississippi), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); see also Vernon Carstensen, Patterns on
the American Land, PUBLIUS, Autumn 1988, at 31, 31–39 (1988) (offering a
concise description of the public land survey system).
13. Land Ordinance of May 20, 1785, in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 375–406 (J.C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933); see also Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (citing 1 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 565 (1815)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 USC at LVII (2012).
17. See Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173–74 (1914) (“The gift to the
state is absolute, although, no doubt, as said in Cooper v. Roberts, ‘there is a sacred
obligation imposed on its public faith.’ But that obligation is honorary . . . .”).
18. See Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 39, § 11, 2 Stat. 391, 394 (1806); Act of
March 3, 1811, ch. 46 § 10, 2 Stat. 662, 665 (1811); see also Papasan v. United
States, 756 F. 2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
19. Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 39, § 11, 2 Stat. 391, 394 (1806); see also JOHN
L. MADDEN, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA 232 (1973).
20. Louisiana v. William T. Joyce Co., 261 F. 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1919) (At
least one scholar has suggested that this statute was unnecessary considering the
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Decisions in both federal and Louisiana courts during the next
half-century confirmed that Congress donated their title to the land
in the form of a grant to each state, with the express condition of
reserving Sixteenth Sections for school use.21 While never
expressly using the term, the text of the federal grants often
describe the state as a trustee of the land on behalf of the people of
the state for the purposes of public education.22 Despite the school
boards’ administrative authority over Sixteenth Section land, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that school boards were not,
and had never been, owners of the land.23 Other Louisiana courts
have also maintained that, while the state owns Sixteenth Section
lands, they are unique and separate from all other forms of public
land and are placed under the administrative control of parish
school boards.24

State of Louisiana already possessed the right to sell these lands through its fee
simple ownership.). See Ryan M. Seidemann, Curious Corners of Louisiana
Mineral Law: Cemeteries, School Lands, Erosion, Accretion, and Other Oddities,
23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 93, 106 (2009).
21. See Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173, 181–82 (1855) (“The trusts created
by these compacts relate to a subject certainly of universal interest, but of
municipal concern, over which the power of the State is plenary and exclusive. In
the present instance, the grant is to the State directly, without limitation of its
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith.”); Garland
v. Jackson, 7 La. Ann. 68, 68 (1852) (“The sixteenth section of every township of
the public lands of the United States, have, from the adoption of the Constitution,
been reserved from public sales, for the maintenance of public schools in the
township; and this reservation has always been considered a grant to the State in
which it lies, on the admission of the State into the Union.”).
22. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Ober, 32 La. Ann. 417, 419 (1880) (“These lands
were donated by Congress to this State for public school purposes. By Act of Feb.
15, 1843, the legislature was authorized by Congress to provide for their sale and
the conveyance of a fee simple title to the purchaser, and the manner of sale and
disposition of proceeds was prescribed by our legislative Acts of 1855. The State
is a trustee of the lands, or of the proceeds of their sale, for the use of the
inhabitants of the townships wherein they are located.”). For a discussion of this
development in states other than Louisiana, see Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223
(Wyo. 2003); Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at
Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 810 (1992).
23. See Ober, 32 La. Ann. at 419 (“The title to this land has never been in the
parish Board of School Directors. The title was in the State under the donation of
the general government, and she held it for a specific purpose, with authority to
sell the lands, and a mandate to hold the proceeds and invest them for the benefit
of the schools.”).
24. See State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 197 So. 140, 144 (La. 1940) (“For
more than one hundred years it has been the settled policy of this State, as
reflected in various constitutional and statutory provisions, to treat sixteenth
section lands as separate and distinct from all other State lands and to place them
under the control of the school authorities.”).

2014]

COMMENT

365

Since Louisiana joined the Union, its legislature has statutorily
delegated the power to maintain and dispose of the reserved
Sections to the school boards of each parish in which they are
located.25 Three sections of Louisiana’s Revised Statutes govern
Sixteenth Section land, also referred to as “school lands.”26 Under
current statutes, individual parish school boards have the right to
administer and use Sixteenth Section land for public school
purposes.27 School boards may rent the land or even sell excess
land within a Sixteenth Section with voter approval, so long as the
revenue from any such sale is used for public school purposes.28
School boards are also empowered to grant mineral leases on
Sixteenth Section land, subject to approval by the State Mineral
Board.29 However, the statutes do not discuss the school boards’
relationship to the state in regards to the state’s constitutional
immunity from prescription. The failure of the statutes to directly
address the nature of this ambiguous relationship has led to a
divided jurisprudence on the issue.
B. Liberative Prescription in Louisiana Law
Prescription is a mode of acquiring or discharging rights
through the passage of time.30 There are three types of
prescription: acquisitive, liberative, and nonuse.31 Acquisitive
prescription solidifies ownership in a possessor after a set amount
of time.32 Prescription of nonuse, on the other hand, extinguishes
the right of a possessor if that possessor fails to exercise his or her
right during a set amount of time.33 Liberative prescription, of
which this Comment is chiefly concerned, is a mode of
25. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013); see also Humble Oil, 197 So.
140.
26. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:631–41:981 (2006 & Supp. 2014)
(governing the rules associated with public lands and chapter six of that title
contains the rules relating to sixteenth section “school lands”); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:151–30:159 (2007 & Supp. 2014) (governing leases by State political
subdivisions in which school lands are included); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:87–
17:87.9 (2013) (governing the administration of sixteenth section land by school
boards).
27. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:638 (2006).
28. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:639 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:714
(2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:841 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 41:981(E)
(2006).
29. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:152, 30:158.
30. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, Prescription, in YIANNOPOULOS’ CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK 294 (9th ed. 2009).
31. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3445 (2014).
32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3446 (2014).
33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3448 (2014).
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extinguishing certain legal claims after the passage of a certain
amount of time.34 Liberative prescription functions as the civil law
equivalent of common law statutes of limitation.35 Prescription is
fundamental in civil law jurisdictions.36 Cicero described
prescription as that which “ends the fear of the dangers of
litigation.”37 Indeed, civilian scholars have often noted that the
primary social utility of prescription is stability achieved by
assuaging such fears in the general public.38 After a set time,
owners no longer must prove the validity of their title, and
individuals no longer need to protect their patrimony from legal
claims.
While the policy behind prescription is rational, the time
periods imposed are varied and often appear arbitrary.39 In
Louisiana law, the Civil Code of 1825 established prescriptive
periods of ten years for contract claims, three years for delinquent
pay, and one year for tort claims.40 However, the Civil Code of
1825 maintained numerous exceptions to these three varieties, each
themselves of a different length of time.41 Title XXIV of the
current Louisiana Civil Code was last revised in 198342 and
contains the articles governing prescription.43 Prescriptive periods

34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3447 (2014).
35. See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT
LAW § 10.02 (2d ed. 2004).
36. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, supra note 30, at 294. See also DIAN
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT ET AL., YIANNOPOULOS’ CIVIL LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK
295–330 (9th ed. 2009).
37. “[F]inis solici tudinis ac periculi litium.” M. TULLII CICERONIS,
ORATIONES, VOLUME II 288 (George Long & A.J. Macleane eds., 1855).
38. Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie & Albert-Anatole Tissier, Prescription, in 5
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 16 (La. State Law Inst. Trans., 1972).
39. See generally Benjamin West Janke, The Failure of Louisiana’s
Bifurcated Liberative Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. REV. 620 (2008). In
Louisiana’s original Digest of 1808, largely based on the French Civil Code, a
general prescriptive period of 30 years was imposed for all actions with a
multitude of exceptions. For example, “architects or undertakers were granted
either a ten- or five-year prescriptive period depending on the type of building
material used.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 73 (1808). The Civil Code of 1825 eliminated
the general time period and imposed a prescriptive period of ten years for contract
claims, three years for delinquent pay, and one year for tort claims while retaining
numerous exceptions of varying lengths of time.
40. See Benjamin West Janke, The Failure of Louisiana’s Bifurcated
Liberative Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. REV. 620, 641 (2008).
41. Id.
42. See Act No. 173, 1983 La. Acts 429 (revising Title XXIV articles on
prescription).
43. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3445–3505 (2014).
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range from thirty, ten, five, two, and one year(s).44 Regarding
Sixteenth Sections, Louisiana prescription law makes it necessary
for school board members, who are often not attorneys, to be
cognizant of this varied structure when contracting mineral leases.
Though the time period of prescription varies widely with the
type of property and the cause of action, all actions involving
private persons and private things are susceptible of prescription
unless prohibited by statute.45 Prescription does not, however, run
against public things.46 Additionally, Article XII of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 specifically prohibits the running of
prescription against the state.47 The effects of these provisions for
disputes over Sixteenth Section land are easily recognizable. If the
state is considered the owner, prescription cannot run against any
potential action brought by a school board for any issue regarding
Sixteenth Section land.
C. Prescription and Sixteenth Section Land: Differing
Interpretations
During the twentieth century, a jurisprudential divide emerged
over whether school boards enjoyed the immunity from
prescription provided to the state by the Louisiana Constitution.
One line of jurisprudence, beginning early in the twentieth century,
held that actions involving these lands benefited from the state’s
prescription immunity even though school boards were statutorily
empowered to administer Sixteenth Section land in a fairly
autonomous way. In 1912, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided
State v. F.B. Williams Cypress Co.48 In that case, the Assumption
Parish School Board sued for damages resulting from unlawful

44. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3486 (establishing acquisitive
prescription of thirty years for immovables); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3491
(establishing acquisitive prescription of ten years for movables); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 3497 (establishing liberative prescription of five years for the included
actions); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3494 (establishing liberative prescription of
three years for the included actions); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3493.10 establishing
liberative prescription of two years for delictual actions as a result of an act of
violence); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (establishing liberative prescription of
one year for all other delictual actions).
45. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3467; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3485.
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 405 (2014) (noting that the imprescriptibility of
such things is a consequence of their insusceptibility of private ownership).
47. See LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13 (reasoning expression unius exclusion
alterius).
48. State v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 58 So. 1033 (La. 1912), amended by
61 So. 988 (La. 1913).
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conversion of timber on Sixteenth Section land.49 The defendant
timber company claimed the one-year prescriptive period for
conversion had expired.50 The timber company additionally argued
that the state’s immunity from prescription only applied in
situations where the state sued on her own behalf and not when it
was merely represented as a trustee by a particular school board.51
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument.52 The court
held that, although the school boards aided the state in directing the
land towards an educational purpose, the state remained the owner,
and therefore prescription could run against the state in a Sixteenth
Section action.53
In 1915, in State v. New Orleans Land Co., the board of
directors of public schools in Orleans Parish sued to reclaim
Sixteenth Section land previously purchased by the defendant.54
The defendant land company claimed that its ancestors in title had
predated Louisiana’s admission to the Union and acquired
ownership through acquisitive prescription after the passage of the
requisite thirty years.55 The Louisiana Supreme Court held in favor
of the school board and stated that prescription could not run
against the state on its own property, which included Sixteenth
Section land.56
During the 1920s, the Louisiana Supreme Court shifted
perspective and held that school boards were state agencies, which
are not entitled to the immunity from prescription granted to the
state. The Louisiana Supreme Court first propounded this
reasoning in regards to state levee boards. In Board of
Commissioners v. Pure Oil Co., the levee district sued for unpaid
royalties due under a mineral lease.57 The defendants pled threeyear liberative prescription.58 The levee board argued that it was a
state agency created by the state for the sole purpose of carrying

49. Id. at 1034.
50. Id. at 1036.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1037 (“The proposition that the rule of prescription established by
the Constitution does not apply to the state in her capacity as trustee is untenable.
Everything that the state holds in her capacity as sovereign she holds as trustee.”).
54. State v. New Orleans Land Co., 79 So. 515, 516 (La. 1918).
55. Id.
56. Id at 519. (“Prescription acquirendi causa does not run against the state for
her own property. Still less could it be allowed to run against the state for school
land.”).
57. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Pure Oil Co., 120 So. 373, 374 (La. 1928).
58. Id at 374.
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out state duties and should therefore be immune from
prescription.59 The court rejected this argument and held that:
[P]laintiff has, and always has had, the right to sue and to
be sued in its corporate name. It is a separate entity from
the state, created by the state, it is true, to accomplish
certain public purposes, but is nevertheless distinct from it.
. . . [W]e therefore rule that the prescription pleaded runs
against plaintiff.60
In 1959, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended this reasoning
to school boards in Stokes v. Harrison.61 In Stokes, the Beauregard
Parish School Board purchased a tract of non-Sixteenth Section
land and subsequently sold it.62 Thirty-five years later, and after a
handful of subsequent sales and purchases of the land, the final
purchaser executed a mineral lease on the property.63 Shortly
thereafter, the school board executed its own mineral lease on
same the property.64 In the suit that followed, the school board
claimed that the tract of land became state land after its purchase
by the school board.65 Therefore, as state land, the state and the
school board retained ownership of the mineral rights for the land
based on the Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition against state
alienation of minerals.66 The defendant argued he was owner of the
land’s mineral rights by acquisitive prescription of thirty years.67
The Supreme Court ruled against the school board on
constitutional grounds.68 The court examined the applicable
portion of Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 and
found the text illustrative.69 In the sections of that article dealing
with the inalienability of the state’s mineral rights, the court found
that the word “state” appeared alone, where other sections referred
to the “state or any political corporation thereof.”70 The 1922
legislative act that provided for the creation of Louisiana’s school
boards stated that “parish school boards are constituted bodies
59. Id. at 809.
60. Id. at 377; see also Bd. of Comm’rs v. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, 113 So. 127,
128 (La. 1927) (applying identical rule to New Orleans Port Commissioners
Board).
61. Stokes v. Harrison, 115 So. 2d 373 (La. 1959).
62. Id. at 375.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. (referencing LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1921)).
67. Stokes, 115 So. 2d at 375.
68. Id. at 380.
69. See id. at 378.
70. See id. at 379.
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corporate.”71 The court noted that “[n]owhere, however, do we find
a parish school board called the ‘State.’”72 Therefore, the court
held that a school board is an “agency of the state, a corporate
body and political corporation, the recipient from the Legislature
of certain delegated powers”, but not itself the state.73
In 1978, the Louisiana Supreme Court refined this position in
Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc.74 The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 altered the provision of the previous
constitution on which the Stokes court relied.75 The new
constitution’s provision dealing with the alienability of mineral
rights stated that “mineral interests of the state, of a school board,
or of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription.”76 Based on
this new provision, the LeBlanc court acknowledged that the 1974
Constitution expressly overruled the Stokes holding and affirmed a
lower court, ruling that levee districts were to be considered the
“state” under the new constitution.77 While this provision dealt
only with mineral rights and not with prescription in general, it
suggested that Louisiana’s legislature intended to include school
boards, like levee districts, as the state with regards to
prescription.78
Despite the holding in LeBlanc, in 1981, the Louisiana
Supreme Court returned to the subject in State ex rel. Department
of Highways v. City of Pineville.79 In that case, the Department of
Highways advanced the City of Pineville a substantial sum of
money in order to relocate water lines for the expansion of a local
highway.80 The city accepted the cash advances but failed to repay
them.81 The suit occurred six years after the advances, and the trial
court held the cash advance to be a loan, which has a prescriptive
period of three years.82 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that,
71. Id. at 376 (citing Act. 100, 1922 La. Acts 204).
72. Id. at 377.
73. Id.
74. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978).
75. Id. at 734 n.1.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 734 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 336 So. 2d 248, 253
(La. Ct. App. 1976) (“Accordingly, we hold that a levee district, which was
created as an arm of the executive branch of government for the purpose of
carrying out a governmental function, i.e., flood control, is the ‘state’ within the
intent of Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of 1921.”)).
79. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49 (La.
1981).
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 50–51.
82. Id. at 51.
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even though the Department of Highways was a portion of the
executive branch of the Louisiana state government, it was not to
be considered the “state” and was therefore not entitled to
immunity from prescription.83 This holding seemingly returned to
the reasoning of the Stokes court. The court held that, while a
school board was a state agency and therefore an “instrument” of
the state, it could still sue and be sued independently and therefore
was subject to prescription.84
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit adopted this reasoning regarding Sixteenth Section lands in
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Mobil Oil Corp.85 In that case,
the school board leased a certain tract of Sixteenth Section land in
Terrebonne Parish to the Southern Natural Gas Company in
1957.86 The lease specifically granted Southern the right to dredge
canals and perform other actions conducive to mineral exploration
on the property.87 Southern subsequently assigned the lease to
Mobil Oil.88 Mobil then drilled and operated an oil well on the
Sixteenth Section in question until 1959, when the well was
capped and abandoned.89 Terrebonne Parish School Board
eventually filed a petition in its own name.90 The Terrebonne
Parish School Board sought damages under both tort and contract
law against Mobil Oil for environmental damages to the leased
Sixteenth Section due to erosion allegedly caused by Mobil’s
drilling.91
Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the
affirmative defense of liberative prescription against the plaintiff’s
delictual claims.92 In opposition to the motion, the school board
argued that claims related to Sixteenth Section lands came under
83. See id. at 52.
84. Id. (“[T]he ‘State’ . . . does not include a state agency which is a body
corporate with the power to sue and be sued and which, when vested with a cause
of action, is the sole party capable of asserting it. Regardless of its status as an
instrumentality of the state, such an agency remains a distinct legal entity subject
to claims of prescription except where the law provides otherwise.”).
85. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870 (5th Cir.
2002).
86. Id. at 873.
87. Id.
88. The assignment in question is known as “farm-out agreement.” See id. at
873 n.2 (noting that “[f]arm-out agreements are frequently utilized in the
petroleum industry in instances where the owner of a mineral lease is unable or
unwilling to drill a lease nearing expiration but is willing to assign an interest to
one willing to assume the drilling obligations and save the lease from expiring”).
89. Mobil Oil, 310 F.3d at 873.
90. Id. at 876.
91. Id.
92. Id.

372

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 2

the protection of the state’s constitutional immunity from
prescription.93 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the statutes relating to
school boards and Sixteenth Section land and concluded that the
school board was a separate entity from the state.94 Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit held that the school board, which entered into a
mineral lease under its own name and of its own choosing, could
not claim to be acting as the “state” and could not avail itself of the
state’s constitutional immunity from prescription.95
D. The Problem: Current Circuit Split
As shown above, twentieth century jurisprudence addressing
Louisiana’s Sixteenth Sections did not develop a clear image of a
school board’s relationship with regards to prescription in cases
involving those lands. In the last decade, two decisions by
Louisiana courts of appeal have again raised the issue. While one
court ruled that Sixteenth Section land should benefit from the
state’s prescription immunity, another ruled that they should not.
1. Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Southdown
In a suit similar to its 1998 action in federal court against
Mobil Oil, the Terrebonne Parish School Board filed suit against
various oil companies in Terrebonne Parish School Board v.
Southdown, Inc. in 1999,96 claiming the defendant companies
caused erosion and diminishment to a Sixteenth Section composed
largely of marshland that the school board had leased to
Southdown.97 The school board sought full restoration of the
property and monetary damages in tort and contract for what was
specifically described as “severe ecological damage.”98 The
defendants argued prescription had run on the claims, and the trial
court agreed.99
93. Id.
94. See id. at 878–79.
95. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d at 881, 883.
96. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Southdown, Inc., 887 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct.
App. 2004).
97. Id. at 9–10.
98. Id. at 10 (“The [Terrebonne Parish School Board] further claimed that this
continuing failure [by defendants] to restore the [school board] property has
caused and continues to cause severe ecological damage . . . by altering and/or
destroying the natural hydrology of the [marsh] located in Section 16, in addition
to causing loss of acreage due to continuing erosion.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. See id. at 11.
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On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit considered the issue of
whether the state’s constitutional immunity from prescription
applied to the school board’s claims regarding Sixteenth
Sections.100 Relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. City of Pineville, the
school board argued that when the state owns property,
prescription cannot run against it, even if a state agency
administers that property.101 The defendants countered that the
proposition advanced by the school board was merely dicta and
was not an accurate representation of the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s holding in City of Pineville, which was that a school board,
having independent power to sue and be sued, could not be
considered the “state.”102
The First Circuit echoed the reasoning of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in City of Pineville and the Fifth Circuit in
Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Mobil Oil: a state agency filing
suit on its own behalf and of its own volition did not qualify for the
state’s constitutional immunity.103 Applying this reasoning, the
First Circuit held in favor of the defendant oil companies and
dismissed the school board’s claims.104 The court stated, “The
State of Louisiana is not a plaintiff in the instant case, and the
governing authority of the parish, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated
Government, did not file suit on behalf of the State. Instead, the
[school board] asserts that it is the owner of all of the [Terrebonne
Parish School Board] property.”105 With this holding, the First
Circuit extended the line of jurisprudence rejecting a state
agency’s, in this case a school board’s, ability to invoke the state’s
constitutional immunity from prescription to the present.
2. Vermilion Parish School Board v. ConocoPhillips
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit produced a
contrary decision in 2012 in Vermilion Parish School Board v.
ConocoPhillips.106 The case, as it appeared before the court of
appeal, was a consolidation of three separate actions for the
underpayment of royalties derived from Sixteenth Section mineral
100. See id.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Southdown, 887 So. 2d at 12.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (La. Ct.
App. 2012).
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leases occurring in the 1990s.107 All defendants filed exceptions of
prescription.108 The trial court ruled that the state was not a party to
the mineral leases, that the school board is a separate body with the
sole power to enter into the mineral lease and that the school board
has the power to sue and be sued.109 Therefore, the court granted
the exception of prescription for each defendant, finding that the
three-year prescriptive period was applicable because only the state
is granted constitutional immunity from suit.110
On appeal, the school board argued that it entered into the
leases on behalf of the state, as trustee for the state as true owner of
the land and its mineral rights, and on behalf of the school
children, the beneficiaries of the trust.111 Actions for the recovery
of royalty payments were, therefore, subject to a three-year
prescriptive period unless the payment was derived from “stateowned properties.”112 Defendants cited City of Pineville and
argued that the school board was given the exclusive right to lease
Sixteenth Section lands.113 As the mineral lessor, the school board
has the capacity to sue to enforce the contractual rights under the
Sixteenth Section land leases, and the defendants argued that it
could not assert the state's constitutional immunity.114
In its analysis, the court confirmed that the title to Sixteenth
Section lands lies with the state.115 Therefore, the state owned both
the land and the mineral rights, and the school boards merely
administered the lands in the state’s name.116 Thus, the school
board was a state agency against which prescription could
potentially run, but actions involving Sixteenth Section lands were
an exception because the school board was merely acting as an
agent for the state.117 The court distinguished the case from
107. See id. at 1236.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1237.
112. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1237.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1239.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1238. Although this Comment focuses on the decision in
ConocoPhilips, at least one other Louisiana Court of Appeal has joined this
reasoning. See State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. La. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 99 So. 3d 1028, 1034 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that prescription does not
run against the state in an action involving Sixteenth Sections), writ denied 107
So. 3d 614 (La. 2013).
117. See ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1240 (“The law is clear that a state
agency can sue and be sued as an independent entity. In that case, the benefit the
State has of immunity from prescription is not applicable. However, Section 16
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Southdown and stated that the Vermilion Parish School Board
benefited from the state’s constitutional immunity because the
Vermilion Parish School Board included the State as a nominal
party in its suit whereas the Terrebonne Parish School Board had
not.118 Therefore, Vermilion Parish School Board’s action for
recovery of royalty payments was not susceptible to prescription.
III. TOWARDS A SOLUTION
When reading the decisions in Southdown and ConocoPhillips
in conjunction with one another, problems become immediately
apparent. The rationales of each case are in direct conflict with one
another. Both cases involved Sixteenth Section land and
prescription issues over mineral leases. The first obvious question
is whether the land or the lease was the determinant factor for
triggering prescription. Southdown holds that the parties to the
lease are key in determining whether prescription began to run.119
In Southdown, the Terrebonne Parish School Board was an agency
acting on its own behalf in making the lease.120 As a result,
prescription could accrue regardless of the ownership of the
land.121 The court in ConocoPhillips, on the other hand, held the
presence of Sixteenth Section land as the key issue.122 Regardless
of the factual autonomy of the school board in its ability to enter
into and litigate over mineral leases, the state remained the owner
of the land; therefore, claims involving those lands were immune
from prescription.123

lands are a different matter. Section 16 lands are lands owned by the State but
managed by the school boards for the benefit of public education.”).
118. See id. at 1241 (“[T]he [Vermilion Parish School Board] entered into
mineral leases as an agent of the State. The [Vermilion Parish School Board] has
sued on behalf of the State and makes no claims that it owns the Section 16 lands
at issue. Section 16 lands and minerals are owned by the State. The State has a
right to sue for underpayment of royalties on Section 16 lands in its own name.
The immunity from prescription provision of La. Civ. Code art. 3494(5) clearly
applies to “state-owned properties.” The [Vermilion Parish School Board’s]
claims that Defendants have improperly calculated and underpaid royalties on the
Section 16 lands mineral leases are not prescribed pursuant to La. Civ. Code art.
3494(5) and La. Const. Art. 12, § 13.”).
119. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Southdown, Inc., 887 So. 2d 8, 9 (La. Ct.
App. 2004).
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id.
122. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1241.
123. Id.
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Another problem is one of statutory construction. The court in
ConocoPhillips cited the language of Louisiana Civil Code article
3494 and noted that three-year liberative prescription did not run
against state-owned properties.124 As a result, the school board
sued for damages in tort rather than for payment of royalties in
Southdown.125 The prescriptive period for tort claims is only one
year and is governed by a different provision of the Civil Code:
Article 3492.126 Article 3492 contains no language exempting
actions involving state owned property.127 The absence of such
language could imply that the Louisiana Legislature intended for
claims involving Sixteenth Section lands to only benefit from
immunity from prescription in suits involving underpayment of
royalties and not in suits involving torts or contracts. It is difficult
to imagine that such a result is what the legislature intended. The
patchwork nature of both the statutory scheme regarding Sixteenth
Section lands, as well as the divided jurisprudence, stems from a
problem of classification of the relationship between the state and
the land.
A. Classification of the Sixteenth Sections
The language used throughout the Acts of Congress that
delegated Sixteenth Sections for public education purposes in all
states was described as a reservation.128 As described above,
Louisiana jurisprudence also adopted much of the language of a
trust relationship in describing Sixteenth Section land.129 However,
in other cases, the relationship has been described as a mandate.130
At least one other case has described school boards as owners of
the Sixteenth Sections themselves.131 Each of these classifications
has a strong presence in both the civilian tradition and Louisiana
124. Id. at 1237.
125. Southdown, 887 So. 2d at 8.
126. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492 (2014).
127. See id.
128. 2 Stat. 391 (1806) (“And be it further enacted, that the President of the
United States be, and he is hereby authorized, whenever he shall think it proper, to
direct so much of the public lands lying in the western district of the territory of
Orleans, as shall have been surveyed in conformity with the provisions of the act
to which this act is a supplement, to be offered for sale. All such land shall, with
the exception of the section “number sixteen,” which shall be reserved in each
township for the support of schools within the same.”).
129. See supra Part II.C.
130. See Bd. of Dirs. of Public Sch. v. New Orleans Land Co., 70 So. 27, 56
(La. 1915).
131. See State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. Plaquemines Parish
Gov’t, 652 So. 2d 1, 5 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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law, leaving open the possibility that one of these relationships
may help to better define the relationship and alleviate the present
confusion. In civil law systems, things are classified for systematic
reasons to facilitate understanding and legal regulation.132 It is
therefore worth stepping away from the current patchwork system
of various revised statutes governing Sixteenth Sections in order to
properly classify Sixteenth Section land in civilian terminology.
1. Public Things and Private Things
First, it is necessary to classify the Sixteenth Section land.
Land, a physical object that can form part of an individual’s
fortune, is clearly a thing according to the Civil Code.133 Things
are divided into common, public, and private things.134 The
Louisiana Civil Code defines public things as things owned by the
state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public
persons.135 Private things, by contrast, are owned by individuals or
by the state and its subdivisions in their capacity as private
persons.136 The distinction is important. If Sixteenth Sections are
public things, they cannot be owned by school boards unless
school boards are considered a subdivision of the state, as all
public things are owned by the state or its subdivisions.137
Professor Yiannopoulos states that public things may be further
divided into two categories.138 The first category consists of things
that are inalienable and necessarily owned by the state or its
political subdivisions.139 The second category consists of things
that, though alienable and thus susceptible of ownership by private
persons, are applied to some public purpose and are held by the
state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public
132. 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 18, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
35 (4th ed. 2001).
133. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 761 (Louisiana historically defines a thing
as anything “which forms the fortunes of individuals.”). The Louisiana Civil Code
does not contain a definition of a “thing,” though Louisiana case law traditionally
attributed Pothier’s definition to the Code. See, e.g., Lombard v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905, 914 (La. 1973) (noting that the Civil Code of 1870
defined an estate as anything of which riches or fortune may consist) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
134. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2014).
135. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2014).
136. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 453 (2014).
137. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450.
138. 3 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 45, in LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (4th ed. 2001).
139. Id.
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persons.140 Sixteenth Section lands would certainly appear to fall
into the latter category. The central problem with classifying
Sixteenth Sections as public things, however, is commerce. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that public things are removed
from commerce.141 It is difficult to contemplate describing
Sixteenth Section land, which can be sold, leased, and rented as
“out of commerce.” It seems more appropriate then that Sixteenth
Sections are private things subject to public use.142 The Civil Code
states that private things may be made subject to public use by law
or by dedication.143 In this case, the original Acts of Congress call
for this reservation, but that call has never been expressly
translated into Louisiana law.144 However, the same Acts of
Congress qualify as a formal dedication under Louisiana law.145 It
seems rational to classify Sixteenth Section lands as a private thing
subject to public use. However, as a private thing, it is necessary to
determine if the state or the school boards are the true owner of
Sixteenth Sections.
2. Ownership of Sixteenth Section Lands
At least one Louisiana court has stated that school boards are
the owners of Sixteenth Section lands.146 However, the vast
majority of Louisiana jurisprudence has held this is not correct.147
Congress reserved and dedicated the Sixteenth Section in each
township for the support of public schools.148 All statutes dealing
with Sixteenth Sections expressly explain that the state owns the

140. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 cmt. c.
141. See City of New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 60 So. 2d 695, 697 (La.
1913).
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 455 (2014).
143. Id.
144. 2 Stat. 391 (1806).
145. See Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Ass’n, 851 So. 2d 1006, 1011
(La. 2003) (“Our legislature has never enacted a comprehensive scheme governing
dedication to public use. . . . In the absence of such a comprehensive scheme, our
courts have recognized four modes of dedication to public use: (1) formal, (2)
statutory, (3) implied, and (4) tacit.”).
146. State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t,
652 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. Ct. App. 1994). (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court held that
passage of the legislation creating the State Mineral Board did not divest parish
school boards of their ownership and rights to lease sixteenth section lands and the
State Mineral Board had no power to do so absent an express legislative statement,
which was not made in the subject legislation.”).
147. See supra Part II.
148. See 2 Stat. 391 (1806); 2 Stat. 662 (1811).
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land in its capacity to own private things, and the school boards
administer the Sixteenth Sections.149
The school boards did not acquire Sixteenth Sections in their
own right; instead, they are merely custodians of the property.150
The State of Louisiana owns Sixteenth Sections in its capacity as a
private person, and those Sections are private things applied to
some public purpose: public education. Therefore, the school
boards are not the actual and true owners of Sixteenth Section
lands since it is clear that the state holds title to the land.
3. Co-Ownership
One possible classification for Sixteenth Sections, considering
the ambiguous treatment of their ownership, is that school boards
and the state are co-owners of Sixteenth Section lands. The Civil
Code states that two or more persons may each own an equal share
of the same thing.151 This possibility is dubious at best. At no point
has any Louisiana statute or any part of the jurisprudence described
the relationship between school boards and the state as coownership of the Sixteenth Sections. Additionally, there are several
factual circumstances that would not suggest a co-ownership
situation.
While a school board as well as the state may use and dispose
of Sixteenth Section lands, a school board does not, as required by
the Civil Code’s articles governing co-ownership, need consent of
the state to make substantial alterations or improvements to the
land.152 Further, a school board, as a state agency, rather than a true
co-owner, does not possess the right to demand a partition of
Sixteenth Section provided by Article 807.153 Most importantly,
co-ownership does little, if anything, to alleviate the issues posed
by prescription. Co-ownership would mean that both the state and
school board own the land indivisibly. There would remain two
owners, one against whom prescription could run and one against
whom prescription is constitutionally barred, thereby providing no
relief to the present confusion. As such, it is best to look elsewhere
to classify this relationship.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013); supra note 26.
See supra Part II.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 480 (2014).
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 804 (2014).
Id.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 807 (2014).
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4. Mandate
When the Louisiana Supreme Court has attempted to define the
ownership of Sixteenth Sections, they articulated the relationship
as a donation from the United States Congress with a mandate to
manage the land for the benefit of public education.154 This
definition provides another possible civilian legal institution for
describing the Sixteenth Section relationship: mandate.155 A
mandate is a “contract in which a person, called the principal,
confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one
or more affairs for the principal.”156 This contract may serve the
interests of the mandatary, the principal, both, or a third person.157
A mandate seems to fit the relationship between the state and the
school boards. Louisiana acquired land from the United States
Congress as a donation and acts as the principal. The school
boards, therefore, function as a mandatary to administer Sixteenth
Sections for the purpose of fostering public education for the
benefit of the state’s school children.
The main obstacle to classifying this relationship as a mandate,
however, is the absence of an express contractual agreement. At its
essence, a mandate is a contract.158 Some statutes governing the
authority of school boards come close to accomplishing the job,
but they ultimately fall short. For instance, one revised statute
dictates a school board’s jurisdiction to include all property
dedicated to education within a specific parish.159 While this
statute and others already mentioned160 define many of the
154. See Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Ober, 32 La. Ann. 417, 419 (La. 1880) (“The title
to this land has never been in the parish Board of School Directors. The title was
in the State under the donation of the general government, and she held it for a
specific purpose, with authority to sell the lands, and a mandate to hold the
proceeds and invest them for the benefit of the schools.”).
155. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2989–3033 (2014).
156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989.
157. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2991.
158. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989.
159. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013) (“[A]ll lands, buildings and
improvements, facilities, and other property having title vested in the public and
subject to management, administration, and control by a parish school board for
public education purposes but located within the geographic boundaries of a
public school board created by the legislature after January 1, 1995, shall be
managed, administered, and controlled by the public school board in whose
geographic boundaries the lands, buildings and improvements, facilities, or other
property is located, effective on the date such school board begins its initial year of
actual operation providing for the education of students within its jurisdiction.”).
160. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:638 (2006) (“Whenever any real property
has been acquired by the state of Louisiana, any municipality, parish school board,
or any other subdivision or agency of the state of Louisiana by virtue of a deed, act
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contours of a school board’s responsibilities regarding Sixteenth
Sections, they can hardly be called a contract between the state and
school boards. The Civil Code requires that each party to a contract
consent to its formation.161 Consent to a contract requires an offer
to be made by one party and then accepted by the other.162 A
school board is an agency of the state created by the state through
the state constitution.163 Their administration of Sixteenth Sections
devolves on them through operation of law through a statute, rather
than their consent to a contract.164 While school boards have
capacity to contract, it cannot be said that the relationship between
them and the state regarding Sixteenth Sections is a true mandate.
5. Trust
A third, and potentially more fruitful, mechanism to classify
this particular relationship is through the institute of a trust. As
noted earlier, the jurisprudence is heavy with references to
Sixteenth Section lands being held in trust by the state and the
school boards for the benefit of public education. A trust is a
common law legal relationship where the trustee undertakes an
obligation at the request of a settlor for the benefit of a beneficiary
third party;165 despite the long history of trusts in the United
States,166 they were long unknown in civil law.167 While always
allowed in common law, separation of management and enjoyment

of sale, donation, or other form of transfer, which contains a stipulation that such
property is to be used for public school or public educational purposes, said deed,
act of sale, donation, or other form of transfer, shall constitute a dedication of such
property to the public for such purposes and the school board in whose district the
property lies shall have the right to administer and use the property for public
school purposes.”).
161. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1927 (2014).
162. See id.
163. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9(A) (“The legislature shall create parish
school boards and provide for the election of their members.”).
164. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.6 (2013).
165. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (8th ed. 1999) (“The right,
enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which
another person holds the legal title; a property interest held by one person (the
trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the
beneficiary).”); see also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS (5th ed. 1973).
166. See generally Carly Howard, Trust Funds in Common Law and Civil Law
Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 343, 351
(2006).
167. See Pierre Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126,
1126 (1927).
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of property is generally only allowed in civil law when a person
lacks capacity to manage on their own.168 Regardless, many of the
concepts embodied in the common law trust have traditionally
been accomplished in civil law jurisdictions.169 Louisiana, as a
mixed civil law jurisdiction and surrounded on all sides by
common law states, chose to adopt its own trust code in 1964170
rather than adopt traditional civilian approaches to the same
relationship.171 The Louisiana Trust Code essentially adopts the
common law institution of trust and attempts to structure it in a
civilian framework.
The current Louisiana Trust Code defines a trust as “the
relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a
person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit of
another.”172 Any property susceptible of private ownership or any
interest in such property may be transferred in a trust.173 The
relationship between the state, school boards, and Sixteenth
Sections seems well situated to be defined as a trust through the
Trust Code. However, there are several statutory difficulties to
defining the relationship through the Trust Code. First, the Code
only contemplates that natural persons, financial institutions, or
private non-profit corporations as these that can serve as trustees

168. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 48 (2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 221
(2014).
169. See Lepaulle, supra note 168, at 1126; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Louisiana Trusts: The Experience of a Civil Law Jurisdiction with the Trust, 42
LA. L. REV. 1721, 1730 (1982). The functions of a trust were accomplished by two
Roman institutions, the fiducia and the fidei commissum. The fiducia was a twoparty relationship composed of two elements: (1) the real portion, consisting of the
conveyance of dominium of the res to the fiduciary, and (2) the personal or
contractual portion, consisting of the agreement by which the fiduciary assumes
duties toward the beneficiary, or fideicomitente, to use the property for the latter's
benefit under specified conditions imposed and then to return the property when
the purpose is fulfilled, either to the original transferor or to a third party
nominated by him. The beneficiary in the fiducia has no enforceable action at
strict law, but only an action in personam. The fidei commissum was a relationship
in which property is given to a fiduciary, who is to later turn the property over to
another, the fidei commissarius. This mechanism differs significantly from a trust
in that the first grantee or beneficiary manages the property for his own interests
and under no specific instructions from the transferor. The interests of the grantees
are thus successive, rather than concurrent, as in a trust. Finally, the fidei
commissum may only be created by testament.
170. See Lorio, supra note 170, at 1729–39 (discussing Louisiana’s trouble
with adopting a trust code).
171. Id.
172. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1731 (2005).
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1771 (2005).
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and beneficiaries.174 Second, the Trust Code specifies that trusts be
made by authentic act under private signature.175
Clearly, the Louisiana Trust Code only contemplates written
instruments between individuals and corporations, rather than an
agreement between the state and the public. However, if the state
and school boards are considered to be acting in their capacity as
private persons, the trust relationship seems to properly account for
all of the facets of the relationship. The state, as trustee, holds the
Sixteenth Section land and all fruits and products thereof in trust
for the beneficiary, which are the state’s citizens in this case. The
trustee delegates the authority to administer the property to school
boards. Conceivably, this classification would solve the issue of
prescription as the state, in its capacity as trustee, holds title to the
Sixteenth Section lands and school boards merely act on the state’s
behalf.
For the purposes of Sixteenth Sections, the beneficiary is not
clearly stated. The benefit should devolve on public education.
This would seem to suggest that the public is the beneficiary of this
agreement. The Trust Code allows a trust to be created for a class
of persons; however, it only contemplates a collection of an
individual’s descendants.176 Regardless, the trust relationship
offers a much more workable classification than other civilian
options available.
To summarize, it is clear that Sixteenth Sections are private
things subject to public use that are owned by the state and
administered by school boards. Viewed as a trust relationship, the
United States as settlor granted Sixteenth Section land to the state
of Louisiana. The state holds these lands as trustee; when school
boards engage in juridical acts involving Sixteenth Sections, they
function as the state in its capacity as trustee.177 Therefore, actions
involving Sixteenth Section lands should not be subject to
prescription because the state, in its capacity as a private person,
owns these lands that are merely administered by school boards.
B. The Public Trust Doctrine and the Louisiana Constitution
Another potential solution to the issue of prescription involves
the interplay between Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution and
174. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1783 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1801
(2005).
175. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2051 (2005).
176. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1893 (2005 & Supp. 2014).
177. See State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. La. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
99 So. 3d 1028, 1034 (La. Ct. App. 2012), writ denied 107 So. 3d 614 (La. 2013)
(adopting the theory that the state acts as trustee for Sixteenth Section lands).
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the one legal framework that allows the general public to function
as a trust beneficiary: the public trust doctrine. The public trust
doctrine provides that public trust lands, waters, and living
resources in a state, are held by the state in trust for the benefit of
all of the people. The public trust doctrine also establishes the right
of the public to fully enjoy public trust lands, waters, and living
resources for a wide variety of recognized public uses.178 As a
common law doctrine, the public trust doctrine is not a codified
body of law, but a loose conglomeration of maxims that allows
common law judges to restrict improper uses of public lands.179
Clearly, the public trust doctrine provides an ideological
foundation for extending prescription immunity to Sixteenth
Section lands. Additionally, the doctrine has previously been wellreceived in other aspects of Louisiana policymaking. For example,
some have advocated for an increased reliance on the public trust
doctrine as a foundation for governmental defense of Louisiana’s
coastal wetlands.180 Others, however, have pointed out that
adoption of a loose common law doctrine is non-civilian and not
consistent with Louisiana law.181 Louisiana, as a mixed jurisdiction
state, already has many statutes addressing the same principles.
Louisiana has never expressly adopted the public trust doctrine;
however, it is embodied in parts of both the Louisiana Constitution
and the Civil Code.182
Article IX, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution states that
“[t]he natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar
as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of
the people.”183 This article demonstrates a firm commitment by the
Louisiana government to protect the natural resources of the state.
Similarly, the Civil Code states that some things are owned by the
178. James G. Wilkins & Michael Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 861, 862 (1992).
179. See Lee Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53
LA. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (1993) (“Though the expression public trust doctrine is
often used with different meanings, it is used here to refer to a body of law
governing use of public lands and water bottoms that contains some concept of a
legal right in the general public; it must be enforceable against the government;
and it must be capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns
for environmental quality.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. See Wilkins & Wascom, supra note 179, at 861; see also Sam Brandao,
Comment, Louisiana’s Mono Lake: The Public Trust Doctrine and Oil Company
Liability for Louisiana’s Vanishing Wetlands, 86 TUL. L. REV. 759, 776 (2012).
181. See Hargrave, supra note 180, at 1536.
182. See Wilkins & Wascom, supra note 179, at 868.
183. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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state for the benefit of public use.184 The Louisiana Supreme Court
has also directly acknowledged that the public trust doctrine is
implicitly embodied in Article IX of the Louisiana Constitution. In
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control
Commission,185 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether
Article IX of the Constitution permitted the state’s Environmental
Control Commission to grant permits for a hazardous waste
disposal facility.186 The court held that Article IX’s rule was a
“rule of reasonableness,” which “requires a balancing process in
which environmental costs and benefits must be given full and
careful consideration along with economic, social and other
factors.”187
Subsequently, in Avenal v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court
considered whether a project to introduce freshwater from the
Mississippi River into saltwater marshes to combat coastal erosion
was allowed under Article IX.188 The added freshwater made the
particular marshes less adequate for oyster cultivation, and various
oyster fisherman sued in a class action.189 The court held that the
freshwater diversion plan was in line with the public trust doctrine
and was constitutional despite the economic hardships imposed on
fishermen.190
Considering the public trust doctrine together with
jurisprudence produces an additional judicial solution for the
prescription problem with Sixteenth Sections. Just as the Louisiana
Supreme Court defined coastal wetlands as a protected resource
under Article IX in Save Ourselves, it is well within the power of
the court to define Sixteenth Sections as a protected natural
184. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2014); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 452
(2014).
185. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La.
1984).
186. Id. at 1154.
187. Id. at 1157.
188. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004).
189. Id. at 1091–92.
190. Id. at 1101–02 (“We find that the implementation of the Caernarvon
coastal diversion project fits precisely within the public trust doctrine. The public
resource at issue is our very coastline, the loss of which is occurring at an alarming
rate. The risks involved are not just environmental, but involve the health, safety,
and welfare of our people, as coastal erosion removes an important barrier
between large populations and ever-threatening hurricanes and storms. Left
unchecked, it will result in the loss of the very land on which Louisianans reside
and work, not to mention the loss of businesses that rely on the coastal region as a
transportation infrastructure vital to the region's industry and commerce. The State
simply cannot allow coastal erosion to continue; the redistribution of existing
productive oyster beds to other areas must be tolerated under the public trust
doctrine in furtherance of this goal.”).
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resource as well. This reclassification would effectively resolve the
prescription issue and render the ownership of Sixteenth Section
land a moot point. Additionally, considering the original and
enduring purpose of Sixteenth Section lands, it would be proper to
hold actions involving Sixteenth Section lands immune from
prescription despite the potential for economic hardships oil
companies, just as the court did in Avenal.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is becoming increasingly difficult to separate energy policy
from the policy of natural resources.191 Whether it is oil, natural
gas, wind, water, or nuclear power, each energy source has
implications for public and natural resources. Louisiana has, for
many years, occupied a critical place in the United States’ energy
industry. Oil and gas drilling and mineral exploration are central
components of Louisiana’s economy. As the nation’s energy
consumption continues to expand, more natural resources will need
to be expended to satisfy the demand. In the long term, lawmakers
will be forced to make more value judgments about which
resources will and will not be sacrificed to satisfy America’s
energy demand.
In the short term, the law controlling Louisiana’s Sixteenth
Section land demands clarity. If Louisiana’s legislators can control
the future, Louisiana’s judges can control the present. The
solutions discussed are not the only solutions to the problems
surrounding Sixteenth Section land. A comprehensive revision of
the revised statutes governing public school lands could also be
beneficial to Louisiana and would alleviate this problem and
others. Even without such a revision, however, the current
jurisprudence provides the Louisiana Supreme Court two avenues
to mend the current circuit split and provide some future security
to Louisiana public education.
While not as visible as an endangered species or a vanishing
wetland, the land set aside in Louisiana and other states for public
education by the founding fathers is an immense natural resource,
and it deserves protection, even if that protection requires
inconvenience for the energy industry. Sixteenth Section lands
were granted to the state solely to enhance the quality of education
for the state’s youth. Only if these lands remain solely reserved for
that purpose, will they function as Thomas Jefferson once hoped.
The realization of those hopes is certainly worth forcing company
191. See generally Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a
National Resources Policy, NATURAL RES. & ENV'T, Winter 2005, at 9.
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lessees into a greater burden of vigilance in legal actions.
Regardless of whether the Louisiana Supreme Court adopts a trust
classification or grants natural resource status to Sixteenth Section
lands, it must overturn the line of cases ending in Southdown and
hold actions involving Sixteenth Section lands immune from
prescription. To do otherwise betrays the goals for which these
lands were originally entrusted to the state.
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